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General observations
In this book Paul Weingartner investigates what it means that 
God is omniscient and defends the coherence of this claim as he 
understands it. For this he relies on translating claims and argu-
ments into the symbols of predicate logic. The structure of the 
book follows  Thomas  Aquinas’s  example:  each  chapter  has  a 
question as heading, then arguments for one answer are repor-
ted, then arguments for the other answer, then the author de-
fends his own view. Although I found that some of the questions 
posed have an obvious answer and that Weingartner sometimes 
adds  excursuses  which  are  not  necessary  for  answering  the 
question, this yields a clear line of thought and makes the book 
reader-friendly. Also with respect to the content the book fol-
lows Thomas Aquinas. In particular, it assumes that God is out-
side of time and that God has infallible foreknowledge of all fu-
ture events, including free actions. But unlike some Thomist lit-
erature, it is not dependent on Aquinas’ terminology and onto-
logy, and is thus accessible also to non-Thomists. The book has 
some limited exchange  with  the  vast  contemporary  literature 
about omniscience and with the contemporary philosophy of re-
2ligion, but one may desire more. 
That  Weingartner  wrote  this  book  in  English,  although  his 
mother-tongue is German, has the advantage that it increases 
the possible readership of the book, but a disadvantage is that 
the book is stylistically not as good as it would be in German. 
There are quite a few mistakes1, some of which are consistently 
repeated, in particular the use of ‘what’ as a relative pronoun, 
which does not exist in English. The first heading in the table of 
contents contains a spelling mistake, a mistake in the word or-
der,  and  ‘what’  as  relative  pronoun:  ‘Whether  Everything  is 
Ttrue What God Knows’. Commas are often missing. 
The typesetting of the book is deficient. There is no indentation of first lines of 
paragraphs (while there are no spaces between paragraphs); instead of quotation 
marks (“xyz”) primes ("xyz") are used; and, oddly, headings are double-spaced. 
Furthermore, there is no hyphenation at all! Even word processors can do these 
things. – But let us not allow this to detract us from the philosophical content of 
the book. 
Belief and knowledge
The book does not begin with an explication of what is meant by 
‘There is a God’, but starts directly with the question whether 
everything that God knows is true. Weingartner expresses this 
in symbols as
gKp → p
Thus Weingartner assumes that the arrow correctly expresses 
here the link between divine knowledge and truth which is de-
scribed by ‘Everything that  God knows is  true’,  even without 
modal  operator  and  even  without  universal  quantifier.  As  it 
stands, the formula only means that it is not the case that ‘gKp’ 
as well as ‘¬p’ are true. Weingartner adds that the ‘question can 
also be expressed by asking whether God is infallible’. The same 
question? That God is infallible implies (a) that he has only true 
beliefs,  and furthermore (b)  that  it  is  impossible  that  he  has 
false beliefs. But ‘Everything that God knows is true’ does not 
even entail (a),  because even if God had many false beliefs it 
would be true that everything he knows is true. It is even true 
that everything I know is true, although I have many false be-
1 Some examples of  faulty  sentences:  ‘Concerning terminology a singular 
truth is …’ (67); ‘Jones acts at t that p’ (64); ‘There would be complete agreement under scient-
ists that …’; ‘The main question is whether the antecedent is contradictory and then the premise 
would be true, but logically true or trivially true.’ (64) 
3liefs.  The claim that Weingartner wants to defend is that God 
cannot have false beliefs. This claim is easily granted because it 
is part of the usual concept of God. But his arguments support 
only the analytic claim (KT) ‘If person a knows that p, then p is 
true’ and thus the claim that everything that God knows is true. 
Weingartner seems to think that ‘knowledge’ implies a high de-
gree of certainty or even infallibility. He assumes that if KT is 
true, then: if person  a knows that p, then  a is certain (or be-
lieves  infallibly)  that p.  Weingartner calls  a concept of  know-
ledge which is compatible with (KT) a ‘strong’ concept of know-
ledge (4), and then says that if such a strong concept of know-
ledge is applicable to man, ‘all the more it must be applicable to 
God’ (5). He clearly assumes that to say about someone that he 
knows that p implies that this person has very good evidence or 
is even infallible. 
I  see  not  the  slightest  reason  for  this  assumption,  which 
Weingartner does not defend. We often truly call beliefs ‘know-
ledge’ which are based on rather weak reasons or on rather fal-
lible perceptual experiences. We know many things, but few, if 
any, instances of our knowledge are absolutely certain or infal-
lible. It is true to say that Jones knew that the gardener commit-
ted the theft, because Jones saw the gardener taking the jewels, 
whilst  Jones’s  belief  is  quite  fallible  because  it  had  dawned 
already or because he did not see the gardener’s face. (KT) only 
means that by saying that a knows that p, one also claims that p 
is true. It does not imply a certain degree of evidence. 
Usually it is assumed that ‘a knows that p’ means (1) that a be-
lieves that p, (2) that p is true, and (3) that a’s belief that p is 
justified or not acquired just by luck. Condition (3) specifies a 
certain minimal degree of evidential support, but Weingartner 
seems to assume that  condition (2)  implies  that  the  belief  is 
well-supported or even infallible.  That seems wrong to me.  If 
the concept of knowledge consisted only of conditions (1) and 
(2),  then a true  belief  that the person acquired through luck 
would be truly called knowledge. That shows that condition (2) 
does not make knowledge imply justification or infallibility. It is 
adequate to call a concept of knowledge that implies certainty a 
‘strong’ concept, but it does not become strong in this respect 
through condition (2).  So against Weingartner I suggest, first, 
that we call also some beliefs knowledge that are not very well 
supported,  and,  secondly,  that  condition  (2)  does  not  make 
knowledge imply justification or infallibility, but only means that 
by calling something knowledge we also claim its truth. 
Weingartner introduces a helpful distinction between ‘two dif-
4ferent kinds of belief, a stronger and a weaker one: the stronger 
will be called knowledge-exclusive belief (abbreviated as G-be-
lief)  and the weaker  will  be called knowledge-inclusive belief 
(abbreviated as B-belief)’ (7).  By ascribing G-belief that p one 
implies that the person does not know that p (either because p 
is not true or because the person has no good reasons for his 
belief),  whilst  by  ascribing  B-belief  that  p  one  leaves  open 
whether the person knows that p. The concept of G-belief cap-
tures the concept of belief that is used in the question ‘Do you 
know it or do you believe it?’ In my view this question can be un-
derstood without defining ‘believe’ as excluding knowing, by in-
terpreting it as ‘Do you know it, or do you not know but just be-
lieve it’. But of course already Plato used the concept of G-belief 
as the meaning of the word δόξα. This concept is more often used 
in German than in English. In English, in philosophy as well as 
in ordinary language, the word ‘to believe’ means just to take to 
be true. There is some vagueness about the minimal strength of 
a belief. If someone finds it just a bit more probable than not 
that the theory of evolution is true, then we might be hesitant to 
say that he believes it. But one would not say that something is 
not a belief  because it  is  too well  supported or because it is 
knowledge. In German, on the other hand, the word ‘glauben’ is 
sometimes (but not always) used in this narrow sense (G-belief), 
in particular in situations where the speaker  tries to be philo-
sophical.  Perhaps because of  the influence of  ‘modern’  philo-
sophers like Descartes and Kant, who were so keen on certainty. 
The German word ‘Überzeugung’ is usually not used in this nar-
row  sense  and  is  therefore  often  the  better  translation  of 
‘belief’. 
The first example which Weingartner gives to illustrate the dis-
tinction is a mathematical hypothesis. He says that before it was 
proven the mathematician believed it, but after it was proven he 
‘didn’t any more believe it, but knew’ it (8). I am not convinced 
that  we,  or  mathematicians,  ordinarily  say  of  a  mathematical 
principle after it was proven that we do not believe it, or that we 
do not apply the German word ‘glauben’ any more, but maybe 
some do. Weingartner claims that in science in general in some 
sense ‘there is’ no B-belief:
‘In general we can say that scientific belief (belief in scientific hypo-
theses) – be it in mathematics or in natural science – is always G-
belief: one does not yet have knowledge in the strong sense of KT.’ 
(8)
This can mean two things: (A) The word ‘believe’ if applied to 
belief in a scientific hypothesis (by scientists or by everybody) 
always means G-belief; (B) Belief in a scientific hypothesis al-
5ways falls under the concept of G-belief and thus there is no be-
lief that is B-belief and not G-belief. (B) is obviously false, be-
cause whenever someone has some mathematical knowledge it 
falls under the concept of B-belief (knowledge-inclusive) and not 
under the concept of G-belief (knowledge-exclusive). Therefore I 
assume that Weingartner is affirming (A). But I do not see how 
one can hold this. Is it really contradictory to say that Jones be-
lieves in the theory of evolution and knows that it is true? Does 
one by saying ‘I believe that the Earth is spherical’ imply that 
one does not know it? To take a different kind of example: Is it 
really contradictory to say that I believe F=Gm1m2/d² (the law of 
gravity) and that I know this? Does one by saying ‘Jones believes 
that F=Gm1m2/d²’ imply that he does not know this?  That  does 
not seem to be the case. On the contrary, only rarely do people 
use  ‘believe’  meaning G-belief.  One  example,  used in  certain 
contexts, may be ‘We do not believe in the theory of evolution, 
we know that it is true’. But that is an exception and a polemical 
or metaphorical usage, trying to emphasise that there is very 
much evidence. 
Turning to religious belief then Weingartner says:
‘Religious belief – like scientific belief – is always knowledge-exclus-
ive, i.e. is always first of all G-belief. Since if one believes religiously 
– for instance that Christ came for the salvation of mankind or that 
there will be some kind of conscious life after death – one does not 
know it (and knows that one does not know it). And this holds for all 
religious beliefs […].’ (8f)
This claim too would require more defence. If the disciples saw 
the risen Jesus, they had thereby very strong evidence that Je-
sus was sent by God for the salvation of men. More precisely, it 
would be very likely that it was God who had raised Jesus from 
the dead; and that he did it in order to make it very clear to the 
disciples that Jesus was sent by God and that through him men 
could be saved. Surely their belief that Jesus came for the salva-
tion of mankind would truly be called ‘knowledge’. If that belief 
would not truly be called ‘knowledge’, then very few of our be-
liefs would truly be called ‘knowledge’. But many of our beliefs 
truly are called ‘knowledge’. If there is a God and if some of the 
arguments for the existence of God are successful, then at least 
for some people also belief in God is knowledge. Also the belief 
in God of those who had strong perceptual experiences of God 
would truly  be called ‘knowledge’.  If  the apostle  Paul  on the 
road of Damaskus saw Jesus as the New Testament claims, then 
his belief that Jesus was sent by God for the salvation of men 
was knowledge too. 
6In recent years there has been much debate in the philosophy of 
religion about religious belief that is knowledge. Alvin Plantinga 
has argued in his book  Warranted Christian Belief (2000) not 
only  that  sometimes  religious  belief  is  knowledge  but  that  if 
Christian doctrine  is  true,  then Christians’  belief  in  Christian 
doctrine generally is knowledge. It would have been helpful to 
read here  more about Weingartner’s reasons for his claim that 
religious belief never is knowledge. Of course, religious faith is 
more than belief  and also more than knowledge,  but at least 
Christian faith requires some beliefs, and these beliefs can also 
be knowledge. Some understand faith as involving a certain kind 
of certitude. Others analyse it as belief (B-belief, in Weingart-
ner’s terminology) plus a certain kind of commitment. However, 
in either case a religious doctrine, if it is true, might be known. 
Weingartner’s next claim is that ‘God does have neither B-belief 
nor G-belief’! (9) He gives the following reason: 
‘Since B-belief is a weaker consequence of knowledge, if he pos-
sesses knowledge [, then] he does not possess B-belief, except in an 
inclusive way in the sense that if he knows something he inclusively 
also thinks that it is true.’
I  cannot  follow here,  because  two pages  before  Weingartner 
defined B-belief so that ‘if someone knows something, he also 
believes it, but if he does not believe it, he also does not know 
it.’ (7) It follows from this and God’s omniscience that God has 
many B-beliefs; in fact, he B-believes every true proposition, and 
all  these  beliefs  are  knowledge.  Weingartner’s  distinction 
between G-beliefs and B-beliefs seems to be made for making 
clear that God has many beliefs but no beliefs that are not know-
ledge. All that he believes, he also knows. But for some reason 
Weingartner says instead that God has no B-beliefs. 
Survey
Let us move through the next chapters more swiftly. Chapter 2 
argues that if God knows something, then he knows it necessar-
ily. This amounts to the claim that God knows everything neces-
sarily. Weingartner’s point here is that God knowing p necessar-
ily does not entail ‘necessarily p’. 
Chapter 3 argues that if God knows something, then he does not 
know it  at  some time.  His  knowing something does  not  take 
place at a certain time. Weingartner presupposes that God ex-
7ists outside of time. He distinguishes carefully between the time 
of our universe and ‘time as a chronological order’ (29), which 
consists only in being earlier or later. Many philosophers of reli-
gion  today  (e.g.  Nicholas   Wolterstorff  (1975) and  Richard 
Swinburne (1993))  hold that  God exists  in time in this  latter 
sense, which does not imply laws of nature and a metric of time. 
Weingartner rejects this simply by saying: ‘Since God is eternal 
[in the sense of being outside of time] and a reasonable concept 
of eternity does not involve past and future, chronological time 
cannot be attributed to God.’ (31) 
Chapter 4 argues that God knows all past and present events. 
Few would disagree. 
Chapter  5  argues  that  ‘God’s  knowledge  exceeds  his  power’ 
(41).  By  this  Weingartner  means  that  God  knows  but  cannot 
bring about states of affairs in his own essence and in logic and 
mathematics. Weingartner defines omnipotence as follows: 
‘God is omnipotent iff 
(1) Whatever God wills is realised and 
(2) God can cause (can will, can make) every state of affairs 
(events) which 
(a) is self consistent and
(b) is compatible with God’s essence and
(c) is conditionally compatible with God’s providence and
(d) is compatible with God’s commands.’ (43)
Let me mention two possible objections. (1) is true but it is ob-
jectionable to list it as a condition for omnipotence. If someone 
wills on Friday that it does not rain on the Monday before, then 
that this willing is not realised does not contradict this person’s 
being omnipotent. To be able to change the past (or any other 
impossible action) is not a condition for being omnipotent in a 
useful  sense,  and  in  the  sense  which  Weingartner  defines 
through condition (2). Therefore it is not a condition for being 
omnipotent that whatever one wills is realised. Because of God’s 
other  perfections  it  is  impossible  that  he  would  ever  will  to 
change the past or will some other impossible action, but the 
question is whether (1) is a condition for omnipotence. 
How does Weingartner’s definition of omnipotence exclude be-
ing able to change the past, being able to make Jones freely do 
p, and other impossible actions from what is required for being 
omnipotent?  Weingartner  must  think  that  condition  (2a)  ex-
cludes all this. This presupposes the empiricist assumption that 
if something is impossible, then it (or its description) is incon-
sistent. My own view is that this is not true, unless ‘inconsistent’ 
is simply defined as being impossible. There is arguably no con-
8tradiction in ‘Jones made it on Friday that on Monday before it 
did not rain’, ‘This is green and red all over’, ‘This tone has no 
pitch’, ‘This has spin ½ and is jealous’, and in ‘This has mass 
and  no  charge’.  Yet  these  phrases  describe  something  im-
possible. Another example of something impossible that is con-
sistent is ‘This is water and not H2O’. One does not have to say 
that ‘Necessarily water is H2O’ is meaningful and true, but many 
today would. 
Chapter 6 argues that God does not cause everything he knows. 
Few would disagree,  because the reason why many hold that 
foreknowledge is incompatible with free will is not that God’s 
knowing something causes  it.  Here  Weingartner  defends also 
the more controversial claim that infallible divine foreknowledge 
of all future events is compatible with the existence of free ac-
tions. More on this later. 
Chapter  7  argues  that  God  also  knows  singular  truths.  Few 
would disagree. 
Chapter  8  argues  that  God’s  knowing singular  truths  implies 
that he changes. The author defends this on the assumption that 
God is outside of time and that his knowing something does not 
occur at a certain time. 
Chapter  9  argues  that  ‘God  knows  what  is  not’.  This  claim 
seems trivial to me. Why should anyone hold that in some sense 
God does not know what is not? Weingartner says himself: ‘It 
would be rather absurd to claim of a perfect being that he would 
not know what is impossible according to the laws of logic […] 
Why should a most perfect being not know what states of affairs cannot obtain be-
cause they are logically impossible?’ Yes, why? Weingartner makes in this chapter 
detailed distinctions between several kinds of non-obtaining states  of  affairs  or 
false statements, but the purpose of this did not become clear to me. 
Chapter 10 claims that ‘neither truth nor knowledge can change 
the status of a state of affairs which is expressed by a statement 
or proposition’ (98). What does Weingartner mean by a state of 
affairs? That it can be ‘expressed by a statement’ implies that it 
is  the  meaning of  a  sentence.  Many philosophers  mean by a 
state of  affairs  not something which is  ‘expressed’ but some-
thing which is described by a statement and is its truthmaker. 
For David Armstrong (1997), for example, every thing is a state 
of affairs, and also that stone’s being 3 kg in mass. Also Adolf 
Reinach (1911) meant by a state of affairs not the meaning but 
the  object  and  truthmaker  of  a  statement  or  belief.  But 
Weingartner means by a state of affairs clearly a statement or a 
proposition. He lists 17 different ‘status’ of states of affairs: lo-
gical necessity, mathematical necessity, natural necessity, con-
9tingency,  etc.  (99-102)  So by ‘status’  he means modal  status. 
What  then  does  the  question  ‘Can  truth  nor  knowledge  can 
change the status of a state of affairs’? Can someone’s knowing 
p or p’s being true change p from being contingent to being ne-
cessary? To affirm this seems as absurd as saying that my know-
ing  that  the  Earth  is  spherical  makes  the  Earth  flat.  Yet 
Weingartner makes the effort to defend the claim carefully. For 
example: A logically necessary proposition like p→p is ‘valid in a 
timeless way’ (102).’ ‘Since a change requires a different state 
of affairs at a different time, there cannot be such a change of 
the state  of  affairs  corresponding to such valid  propositions.’ 
That must mean, I think, that a change of the status of the state 
of affairs corresponding to the proposition would require that 
the proposition corresponds at one time to one state of affairs 
and at another time to another one, or that the state of affairs 
undergoes a change. Both is excluded because neither proposi-
tion nor its truth value changes. Therefore the truth of a logic-
ally necessary proposition cannot change the status of the state 
of affairs. That seems trivial to me, but perhaps I have missed 
something. 
Chapter 11 argues that God knows all future states of affairs. To 
defend this, Weingartner introduces Thomas Aquinas’s distinc-
tion between knowing future states of affairs ‘in their causes’, 
i.e. knowing them through knowing their causes, and knowing 
them ‘in their actuality’,  i.e.  knowing them directly (117).  He 
claims that God can even know future states of affairs that are 
ruled by ‘statistical laws’ in their causes. This is surprising be-
cause one should think that if  A caused B indeterministically, 
then the occurrence of A also could have led to another event 
(even without any intervention),  with a probability that is de-
scribed by the statistical laws, and therefore knowing A would 
not entail knowing B. Weingartner’s explanation is this:
‘In the case of statistical laws, an earlier microstate will be called 
the cause of later microstates, which result statistically in a macro-
state, even if not every individual element of them is thereby de-
termined […].’ (118)
Presumably Weingartner here is  assuming the view there are 
valid statistical laws although there are no indeterministic pro-
cesses. That view may be true, but the question is whether God 
can know, through the causes, future events which are the res-
ult of indeterministic processes. I think that it is obvious that he 
cannot, and I cannot find an argument against this in the book. 
Further, Weingartner claims that God also knows future free ac-
tions through their causes. His reasons are this: (a) A free ac-
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tion is one ‘without compulsion from outside’ (120). God knows 
all possibilities of compulsion. (b) God knows the rational delib-
erations leading to an action. (c) God knows all moral reasons. 
(d) God knows all counterfactuals of freedom (truths of the type 
‘If x were to occur, Jones would do y’). 
Of  course,  if  God  knows  all  counterfactuals  of  freedom  and 
knows all future situations into which agents will get, then he 
knows all future free actions. But if the agents have libertarian 
free will, then the actions do not have deterministic causes and 
thus  God  cannot  know  them  through  their  causes.  Perhaps 
Weingartner assumes that there are no,  or cannot be,  agents 
with libertarian free will,  and that man has compatibilist free 
will. Of course, God knows all future compatibilist free actions 
in their causes. But I find in the book no reason for assuming 
that  God  also  knows  future  libertarian  free  actions  in  their 
causes. 
According to Weingartner, God knows all future states of affairs 
not only through their causes but ‘God might have a possibility 
to know future states of affairs in their actual states’ (122). He 
quotes Thomas Aquinas’s argument for this. It presupposes that 
God is outside of time. It is a part of this doctrine that all events 
are are, in some sense, ‘present’ to God. 
Chapter 12 defends the claim that God knows everything that is 
true against the objection that there is no set of all truth. 
The  final  chapter  13  presents  ‘a  theory  of  omniscience’,  by 
which Weingartner means a formal axiomatic system. His aim is 
to show the consistency of his claims about divine omniscience. 
The compatibility between divine foreknowledge and 
free will
Let me return to Weingartner’s claim that infallible divine fore-
knowledge of all future events is compatible with the existence 
of free will. In chapter 11 Weingartner refutes the objection that 
if God foreknows an action, then the action occurs with neces-
sity and thus is not free. The stronger standard objection he dis-
cusses in chapter 6. Let me summarise Weingartner’s interpret-
ation of Nelson Pike’s (1965) argument for the incompatibility 
between complete infallible divine foreknowledge (CIF) and hu-
man free will: 
1. If God has CIF and Jones does p at time t2, then God be-
lieves at time t1 that Jones will do p at t2. (Nelson Pike put it 
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thus:  ‘If  Jones  did  X at  T2,  God believed at  T1 that  Jones 
would do X at T2.’ (Pike 1965, 33) 
2. ‘If God believes that p, then p’. (54)
3.  ‘If  God believes  at  t1 that  Jones  acts  at  t2 that  p  [this 
means ‘Jones does p at t2’],  then, under the condition that 
Jones can act at t2 that non-p, one of the following three con-
ditions […] are satisfied …’ These say that God had a false belief, that 
Jones changed the past, or that Jones abolished God. 
4. If God is omniscient, then all three conditions are false. 
Conclusion:  ‘If God is omniscient and exists at t1, then, under the condition 
that Jones acts at t2 that p, it is not the case that Jones can act at t2 that non-
p.’ (54) He adds: ‘Thus it seems that God, believing that Jones acts at t 2 that p 
causes John to act this way.’ 
Also in a footnote Weingartner claims that ‘the conclusion of the argument is inter-
preted by Pike as saying that Jones’ action at t2 cannot be free, but is determined by 
God’s foreknowledge, i.e. God causes by his foreknowledge.’ (54) But it is not 
true that Pike concludes that God’s foreknowledge would cause actions. Pike ex-
plicitly states:
[T]he argument makes no mention of the causes of Jones’s action. 
Say (for  example, with St.  Thomas)  that God’s foreknowledge of 
Jones’s action was, itself, the cause of the action (though I am really 
not sure what this means). (Pike 1970, 35)
Weingartner’s objection against Pike’s argument is, briefly put, 
this: All the conclusion says is that if Jones did p at t2, then he 
did at t2 not any more have the power not to do p. But that is 
trivial and compatible with the action being free.
Let us look at Weingartner’s formalisation of the argument. He 
renders premise (3) as 
gBt1(jAt2p) → [jCAt2¬p → (i v ii v iii)]
and the conclusion as 
(OSg & E!gt2) → (jAt2p → ¬jCAt2¬p)
Weingartner writes about premise 3: 
‘The main question is whether the antecedent is contradictory and 
then the premise would be true, but logically true or trivially (or 
emptily) true.’ 
It  is unfortunate that such grammatical mistakes were not eliminated  before the 
book  went  into  print.  Besides  that  I  do  not  understand  why  the  antecedent, 
gBt1(jAt2p), should be contradictory. However, Weingartner’s point is that ‘jAt2p & 
jCAt2¬p’ is self-contradictory  because ‘It is just an impossibility to both act at t2 
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that p and have the power (or ability) at t2 to act at t2 that non-p. Such a kind of 
“power” nobody can have[,] not even God, since it would mean an inconsistency.’ 
(64) Then the book continues with the following (ungrammatical) passage: 
‘Therefore with the help of premise 2 it follows from premise 3 that 
the above contradiction implies (i) v (ii) v (iii) which is also logically 
true: (jAt2p & jCAt2¬p) → (i) v (ii) v (iii). Thus it does not matter that 
(i) v (ii) v (iii) is itself contradictory. And so premise 4 is correct of 
course because it is logically true.’ (64) 
Weingartner assumes that ‘(i) v (ii) v (iii)’ is contradictory because it is contradict-
ory that someone abolishes God, that someone makes God have a false belief, or 
that someone changes the past. He summarises: 
‘[E]ven with free (voluntary) actions it holds that if the event (ac-
tion) takes place (at t2) it cannot not take place (at t2). But from this 
one cannot conclude that the action (at t2) is necessary or not vol-
untary, or not free or not contingent.’ (64)
On Weingartner’s interpretation ‘jAt2p & jCAt2¬p’ is self-contradictory and there-
fore the conclusion is trivially true. I suggest that this just shows that the formalisa-
tion does not capture the point of the argument. The real argument for the incom-
patibility between CIF and libertarian free will,  briefly put,  is this: Assume that 
Jones has libertarian free will and that at time t2 he did p. If God has complete in-
fallible divine foreknowledge, then at the earlier time t1 he believed that Jones will 
do p at t2. If Jones has libertarian free will, then he had the power to refrain from 
doing p (and it was after t1 still possible that he would refrain from doing p). This 
would amount to the power to make God’s belief false. Thus it is incompatible that 
God has complete infallible foreknowledge and that Jones has libertarian free will. 
Pike’s phrase ‘if it was within Jones’s power at T2 to refrain from doing X’ means 
that Jones did X freely and could have refrained from doing it. Of course, he could 
have refrained from doing X only instead of doing X. Weingartner interprets the ex-
pression ‘at T2’ in Pike’s statement in a way that makes it incompatible with Jones’s 
doing X.  To  exclude this interpretation,  Pike could have simply said ‘if it  was 
within Jones’s power to refrain from doing X at T2’. The conclusion then is: 
If God existed at T1, and if Jones did X at T2, it was not within 
Jones’s power to refrain from doing X at T2.
As ‘Jones did X at T2’ does not contradict ‘It was within Jones’s 
power  to  refrain  from  doing  X  at  T2’,  this  conclusion  is  not 
trivial.  It means that CIF is incompatible with libertarian free 
will. 
Another  option  is  to  formulate  the  argument  with  the  phrase  ‘it  could  have 
happened instead that’: Assume that Jones has libertarian free will and that at time 
t2 he did p. If God has complete infallible divine foreknowledge, then at the earlier  
time t1 he believed that Jones will do p at t2. If Jones has libertarian free will, then it 
could  have  happened  that  instead  he  did  not  do  p  at  t2.  Thus  it  could  have 
happened that God has a false belief. Thus it is incompatible that God has complete 
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infallible foreknowledge and that  Jones has libertarian free will. I  conclude that 
Weingartner has not defeated the argument for the incompatibility between com-
plete infallible divine foreknowledge and human free will. 
References
Armstrong, David M. 1997: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Pike, Nelson 1965: ‘Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action’. In: Philosoph-
ical Review 74, 27-46.
Plantinga, Alvin 2000: Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Reinach, Adolf 1911: ‘On the Theory of the Negative Judgement’. (Original: 
Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils). In Barry Smith (ed.) 1982: Parts 
and Moments. Munich: Philosophia, 315-377.
Swinburne, Richard 1993: ‘God and Time’. In: Eleonore Stump (ed.), 
Reasoned Faith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 204-222.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas 1975: ‘God Everlasting’. In: Clifton Orlebeke&  Lewis 
Smedes (eds.), God and the Good: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob. 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 181-203.
